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Introduction
Many economic environments feature a large group of agents taking decisions under disperse information about relevant economic fundamentals a¤ecting individual preferences and/or the profitability of investment opportunities.
In such environments, the information that agents optimally choose to collect about the underlying fundamentals is determined by their desire to align their actions with the fundamentals as well as with other agents' actions. Furthermore, because acquiring information is costly, the amount of information collected at the private level depends on the quality of public information provided by policy makers, statistics bureaus, and the like.
In this paper, we investigate how the amount of private information collected in equilibrium di¤ers from the socially optimal one and relate the discrepancy between the two to the primitives of the environment, as well as to the way information is used in equilibrium. We then use such a characterization to revisit the social value of public information, shedding new light on how the desirability of transparency in public disclosures is a¤ected by the endogenous response in the acquisition of private information.
To abstract from speci…c institutional details and identify general principles while retaining tractability, we conduct our analysis within the ‡exible quadratic-Gaussian family of economies studied in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) . This framework allows for both strategic complementarity and substitutability in actions as well as for a rich set of externalities that create possible wedges between the equilibrium and the e¢ cient use of information.
Contrary to Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , however, we allow agents to choose the amount of private information they collect. We assume that the acquisition of private information is costly and allow for an arbitrary cost function. This permits us to interpret the cost of information acquisition either as the monetary cost of purchasing di¤erent sources of information or as the cognitive cost of processing available information, as in the rational inattention literature (e.g., Sims, 2003, and Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) . Importantly, and realistically, we allow agents to change the amount of private information they collect in equilibrium in response to variations in the quality of information provided by policy makers, statistics bureaus, and other sources of public information.
Recognizing the endogeneity of private information turns out to have major implications for the social value of public information as we explain below.
Our …rst result characterizes the amount of private information collected in equilibrium and establishes that the latter is decreasing in the precision of public information, with a degree of substitutability between the two that is increasing in the importance that agents assign to aligning their actions with those of other agents, that is, in the equilibrium degree of coordination. 1 Im-1 Although established in a di¤erent setting, the substitutability between public and private information is also documented in a recent paper by Myatt and Wallace (2012) . The focus of that paper is, however, very di¤erent than the one in the present paper, as discussed below in the section on related literature. portantly, we show that, while the intensity of the substitution e¤ect depends on the strength of the coordination motive, its sign does not: irrespective of whether the economy features strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions, an increase in the precision of public information always leads to a reduction in the amount of private information collected in equilibrium. 2 We then proceed by characterizing the amount of private information that a benevolent planner would like the agents to collect so as to maximize welfare, de…ned as the ex-ante expected utility of a representative agent. Such a characterization has no precedents in the literature and is one of the distinctive contributions of this work.
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is typically ine¢ cient, even in those economies where the use of information (that is, the mapping from information to actions) is e¢ cient. The reason why e¢ ciency in the use does not guarantee e¢ ciency in the acquisition of information is that agents may su¤er (or bene…t) from the dispersion of individual actions in the cross section of the population (as, for example, in beauty contests, or in economies with price-setting complementarities). When such externality from dispersion has a direct, non-strategic, e¤ect on individual utilities, it creates a wedge between the equilibrium and the e¢ cient acquisition of private information, despite the economy responding e¢ ciently to the information it collects. More precisely, the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low in those economies where agents bene…t from the dispersion of individual actions in the population, whereas it is ine¢ ciently high in those economies featuring a negative externality from dispersion.
Next, we consider economies where the ine¢ ciency in the acquisition of information originates in the ine¢ ciency in the use of information. We show that the amount of private information acquired in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low when the equilibrium degree of coordination exceeds the socially optimal one (that is, when the value that agents assign to aligning their actions is higher than the value that the planner would like them to perceive for them to process information e¢ -ciently). The opposite is true in economies where the equilibrium degree of coordination falls short of the socially optimal one: in this case, the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is too high compared to the socially e¢ cient level. From Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , we know that the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination is what drives the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the e¢ cient sensitivity of individual actions to the di¤erent sources of information. Combining the results in this paper with those in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , we can then show that economies where agents overreact to public sources of information are also economies where agents underinvest in the acquisition of private information, whereas the opposite is true for economies where agents under-respond to public infor- 2 The strength of the substitution e¤ect between public and private information also depends on the elasticity of the function determining the cost of private information acquisition. In the paper, we compute bounds for the substitution e¤ect across all possible cost functions, which we then use to sign the social value of public information in various cases of interest. mation. 3 These results hold irrespective of whether the economy features strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and irrespective of the cost of information acquisition.
Lastly, we consider economies where the ine¢ ciency in the collection and use of information originates in the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation (that is, in the discrepancy between the complete-information allocation and the …rst-best allocation). We show that, in these economies, the amount of private information acquired in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low (respectively, high) if the sensitivity of the complete-information allocation to the fundamentals is inef…ciently low (respectively, high). In other words, the direction in which society fails to respond adequately to changes in fundamentals under complete information determines the direction in which it fails to acquire the e¢ cient amount of private information.
Clearly, the cases considered above do not cover all possibilities. There are economies where the ine¢ ciency in the acquisition of information comes from a combination of the three sources identi…ed above: (i) the discrepancy between the private and the social value of reducing the cross-sectional dispersion of individual actions, (ii) the ine¢ ciency in the equilibrium use of information, (ii) the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation. By isolating the source of the ine¢ ciency, the economies discussed above represent useful benchmarks that one can then use to examine more complex economies.
Importantly, the analysis of the ine¢ ciency in the acquisition of private information has implications for the social value of public information. While previous research focused on the partial e¤ect that more precise public information has on welfare holding constant the precision of private information, here we investigate its total e¤ect, taking into account that private agents are bound to change their acquisition of private information in response to variations in the quality of available public information. In particular, we show that, irrespective of whether the economy features strategic complementarity or substitutability, recognizing the endogeneity of private information leads to a higher social value of public information if the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently high, while the opposite is true if it is ine¢ ciently low.
This last result follows directly from the crowding-out e¤ect that more precise public information exerts on the acquisition of private information. When the economy collects too much private information, such crowding-out e¤ect contributes positively to the social value of public information, whereas the opposite is true when the amount of private information collected in equilibrium falls short of the e¢ cient level. Interestingly, recognizing the endogeneity of private information (namely, the fact that agents are bound to change the amount of private information they collect in equilibrium in response to variations in the quality of available public information) may change the sign of the social value of public information. More precisely, we show that there exists a critical threshold > 0 for the discrepancy between the equilibrium ( ) and the socially optimal ( ) degrees of coordination such that, whenever < ; acknowledging the endogeneity of private information can turn the social value of public information from negative to positive, but never from positive to negative. Note that this result is true irrespective of whether or not the economy is e¢ cient under complete information, of whether or not agents bene…t from the dispersion of individual actions in the population, and irrespective of the details of the cost function for the acquisition of private information. Thus, whenever the importance that society assigns to aligning individual decisions does not exceed by too much the socially optimal level, the crowding-out e¤ect that public information exerts on private information is never strong enough to turn negative the social value of public information.
In the last part of the paper, we apply our results to a few applications of interest. We start with a beauty contest framework analogous to the one studied in . We show that, recognizing the endogeneity of private information may change the sign of the social value of public information. This occurs when the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently high. By inducing agents to reduce the amount of private information collected in equilibrium, more precise public information can thus contribute positively to welfare under the same parameters' con…gurations that were shown to lead to a negative social value of public information when ignoring the endogenous response in the acquisition of private information. Quite interestingly, we also show that the reverse is never possible. Even if, in some cases, recognizing the endogeneity of private information may reduce the social value of public information (this occurs when the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low), the latter remains positive whenever it was shown to be positive ignoring the crowding-out e¤ect of public information on private information.
The second application is a monetary economy with monopolistic price competition, along the lines of those studied in Hellwig (2005) , and Roca (2010) . Contrary to the 'beauty-contests', these economies are characterized by the presence of a negative (non-strategic) externality from dispersion and by an ine¢ ciently low degree of equilibrium coordination. Previous research has shown that, in these economies, more precise public information always contributes positively to welfare. Our contribution is in showing that the same conclusion holds when acknowledging the crowding out e¤ect of public information on the acquisition of private information. This e¤ect can reduce the social value of public information in those situations where the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low. However, it is never strong enough to overturn the direct positive e¤ect that public information exerts on welfare by helping …rms better align their pricing decisions.
The last application is a competitive consumer-producer economy with negative externalities from aggregate production, such as those originating from pollution. Contrary to the other two applications, in this economy agents'production decisions are strategic substitutes and there are no direct externalities from the dispersion of individual actions in the population. Moreover, because individual producers ignore the contribution of their production choices to the aggregate externality, this economy is characterized by an ine¢ ciently high degree of coordination (that is, the level of strategic substitutability that the planner would like the agents to perceive is larger than the equilibrium one). Finally, contrary to the other two applications, this economy is ine¢ cient not only in its collection and use of information but also in its functioning under complete information:
production decisions overreact to changes in fundamentals relative to what is e¢ cient. We then show that, in these economies, recognizing the crowding-out e¤ects of public information on private information always increases the social value of public information, and can turn the latter positive in situations where it would have been negative ignoring the endogenous response in the acquisition of private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We brie ‡y review the pertinent literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium collection of private information. Section 5 characterizes the e¢ cient collection of private information. Section 6 studies the implications of the acquisition of private information for the social value of public information. Section 7 contains the applications described above. Section 8 concludes with a few …nal remarks. Finally, Appendix A contains proofs omitted in the main text, while Appendix B shows how the monetary economy with price-setting complementarities examined in Section 7 can be traced back to the abstract framework of this paper after appropriate linear-quadratic approximations.
Related literature
Social value of public information. This paper belongs to the literature that investigates the welfare implications of public information provision. In a highly debated article, show that public information may have a detrimental e¤ect on welfare in economies resembling Keynes' beauty contests. Because the strategic complementarity that agents perceive in their actions is not warranted from a social perspective, and because public information is more e¤ective in aligning individual actions than private information, agents rely too much on public sources of information relative to what is e¢ cient. Furthermore, because the agents' reliance on public information in turn increases with its precision, more precise public information can be welfare decreasing. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that, because in these economies agents may collect too much private information relative to what is e¢ cient, more precise public information, by inducing agents to cut on their collection of private information, may have a net positive e¤ect on welfare in situations in which it was shown to have a negative e¤ect ignoring the acquisition of private information.
Following up on , Cornand and Heinemann (2008) , again in a beauty contest framework, show that more precise public information may have a positive e¤ect on welfare when it reaches only a fraction of market participants. 4 Morris and Shin (2007) also consider an economy characterized by a 'semi-public' signal reaching only a fraction of agents in addition to the usual fully public signal, and show that, in the absence of direct externalities from dispersion, the fragmentation of information always leads to welfare losses. The welfare implications of both papers rest on the fact that some relevant information reaches only a share of market participants.
In contrast, in our framework, the welfare e¤ects of public information depend on the strategic substitutability between private and public information.
The analysis of the social value of information has been extended by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) to a large class of quadratic-Gaussian economies featuring both strategic complementarity and substitutability and a rich set of externalities. The analysis in the current paper is within the same framework as in that paper. As mentioned already, the key di¤erence is that, in the present paper, we investigate the process by which agents respond to variations in the quality of public information by changing the amount of private information that they collect in equilibrium. We identify sources of ine¢ ciency in this process and show how recognizing this process may contribute a di¤erent evaluation of the social value of public information.
Related is also Myatt and Wallace (2008) , who consider a Lucas-Phelps island economy with several (imperfectly correlated) information sources, each of which is neither perfectly private nor perfectly public. They show that it is never optimal for a benevolent planner to provide a perfectly public or perfectly private signal. The welfare implications of more transparency in public information is also the theme of a few recent contributions to the macroeconomics literature on monetary policy with monopolistic competition and dispersed information (e.g., Hellwig, 2005 , Lorenzoni, 2010 , Roca, 2010 , Angeletos, Iovino, and La'O, 2011 .
None of the papers cited above looks at the interplay between the social value of public information and the ine¢ ciency of the acquisition of private information, which is the distinctive feature of this paper.
Endogenous private information acquisition. The role of private information acquisition in coordination settings has been recently explored in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Myatt and Wallace (2012) . Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) show that strategic complementarities in actions induce strategic complementarity in private information acquisition (i.e., "agents who want to do what others do, want to know what others know"), which in turn may lead to multiple equilibria. A similar point is made in Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) ; in a framework with rational inattention, they show that strategic complementarity in price-setting decisions leads to strategic complementarity in the price setters' allocation of attention. Myatt and Wallace (2012) consider endogenous information acquisition in a beauty-contest framework where agents have access to a variety of information sources. In their framework, the precision of each signal depends on both the clarity of the signal (the 'sender'noise, in their terminology) and the attention that an agent devotes to the signal (the 'receiver'noise). As in our model, allocating more attention to a signal entails a larger cost. When agents pay careful attention to the same source of information, the correlation in their signals endogenously increases, which in turn implies an increase in the publicity associated to the signal. 5
Related is also a recent independent paper by Llosa and Venkateswaran (2012) . That paper considers endogenous information acquisition in three applications of interest: a beauty contest similar to , a business cycle model in the spirit of Angeletos and La'O (2010) , and a monetary economy as in Hellwig (2005) . As in the current paper, e¢ ciency in the use of information is shown to be no guarantee of e¢ ciency in the collection of private information.
However, contrary to the present paper, that paper does not identify general conditions (in terms of discrepancy between the private and social value of reducing dispersion, as well as between the equilibrium and the e¢ cient use of information) that are responsible for ine¢ ciencies in the acquisition process.
Importantly, none of the papers cited above looks at the social value of public information and at how the latter depends on the ine¢ ciency of the acquisition of private information, which is one of the distinctive themes of the present paper.
A crucial feature of our model is that private agents respond to variations in the quality of available public information by changing the amount of private information they collect in equilibrium. A similar timing has been considered by Myatt (2008, 2009 ). In a model of political leadership, party activists decide how much attention to pay to di¤erent leaders in order to coordinate their actions. Taking this into account, party leaders may decide to obfuscate the clarity of their communications. The focus of these papers is however very di¤erent from ours:
party leaders maximize the probability of winning the election in these papers, whereas the planner maximizes welfare in our environment.
Endogenous information acquisition is also the theme of Demerzis and Hoeberichts (2007) and Wong (2008) . Di¤erently from us, these two papers assume that agents must choose the quality of their private information before observing the quality of public information, thus abstracting from the crowding-out e¤ects that we document in this paper.
The same theme is also the focus of Colombo and Femminis (2008) . That paper considers the same timing of private information acquisition as in the present paper. However, it restricts attention to a simple beauty-contest environment à la and assumes a linear cost function for both private and public information thus leading to the prediction that, in equilibrium, only one type of information (either public or private) is collected. In addition to the di¤erence in the generality of the framework, the scope of the two papers is fundamentally di¤erent.
While that paper shows that allowing for an endogenous response in the collection of private information may increase the social value of public information, the current paper characterizes the 5 Di¤erently from Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) where the attention devoted to each signal is binary (that is, agents choose whether or not to purchase a signal of given quality), Myatt and Wallace (2012) allow the attention allocated to the various signals to be a continuous variable. This di¤erence turns out to have important implications for the equilibrium determinacy: while there are multiple equilibria in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) , the equilibrium is unique in Myatt and Wallace (2012) .
sources of ine¢ ciency in the acquisition of private information and use the latter to reassess the social value of public information.
Crowding-out e¤ects of public information. Our paper is also related to the literature that documents the crowding-out e¤ects of more precise exogenous public information on the endogenous public information aggregated by prices and other public statistics (e.g., Vives (1993) , Morris and Shin (2005) , Amato and Shin (2006) and, more recently, Amador and Weill (2010) , and Vives (2011)). In these papers, more precise exogenous public information, by inducing agents to rely less on their exogenous private information, has the perverse e¤ect of reducing the informativeness of endogenous public signals. In contrast, in the present paper, more precise public information exerts a crowding-out e¤ect on the agents'collection of private information. Whether such a crowding-out e¤ect contributes positively or negatively to the social value of public information is then shown to depend on whether agents underinvest or overinvest in their acquisition of private information. In the paper, we identify primitive conditions for each case.
The environment
Agents and Information. We study a two-period economy populated by a continuum of agents of measure one, indexed by i and uniformly distributed over [0; 1] . Each agent i observes noisy private and public signals about an underlying fundamental . In period 1, every agent knows the state of the economy 1 , which represents the common ex-ante expectation of the state variable in period 0. The fundamental evolves according to the stochastic process
The shock ', occurring at the beginning of period 0, is normally distributed with mean zero, variance 2 , and precision p 2 . After the realization of the shock, every agent i receives a public signal y = + " and a private signal
where " is normally distributed, independent of , with mean zero and precision p y , and where each noise terms i is normally distributed, independent of , ", and j (j 6 = i), with mean zero and precision p x i . While y is common knowledge among the agents, x i is idiosyncratic to agent i and not observed by any of the other agents. The precision of the private signal may vary across agents and is determined endogenously by the amount of private information collected by the agent, as we explain in more details below.
The common posterior about given public information y is normally distributed with mean 
Actions and Payo¤s. Let k i 2 R denote agent i's action, K R j k j dj the mean action in the cross section of the population, and 2 
As is standard in the literature, we assume that U is approximated by a second-order polynomial and that dispersion k has only a second-order non-strategic external e¤ect, so that U k = U K = U = 0 and that U (k; K; 0; ) = 0, for all (k; K; ). 6 The quadratic speci…cation of the utility function ensures the linearity of the agents'best responses and of the e¢ cient allocations.
In addition to the above conditions, we assume that partial derivatives satisfy the following
Condition (i) imposes concavity at the individual level, so that best responses are well de…ned, while Condition (ii) implies that the slope of best responses is less than one, which in turn guarantees uniqueness of the equilibrium. Conditions (iii) and (iv) guarantee that the …rst-best allocation is unique and bounded, and ensure concavity at the aggregate level. Finally, Condition (v) ensures that the fundamental a¤ects equilibrium behavior.
Timing and Information Acquisition. The economy described above is the same as in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) . To that economy we add an initial stage where agents choose the quality of their private information in response to the policy maker's choice of the precision of public information.
In particular, we assume that in period 1, after the state of the economy 1 in that period becomes common knowledge and after a (benevolent) planner chooses the precision of the public signal p y , private agents simultaneously choose the precision of their private signals p x i about the period-0 fundamental : In period 0, after observing the signals (y; x i ), each agent i then chooses her action k i . Actions are chosen simultaneously by the agents. For convenience, we summarize the timing of the model in Figure 1 .
We denote by C (p x i ) the cost of private information acquisition and assume that C is a continuously di¤erentiable function satisfying 
As standard in this literature, we do not model the cost for the provision of public information.
The reason is that our interest is in the characterization of the ine¢ ciencies in the collection of private information and on how they a¤ect the marginal bene…t of more precise public information.
Introducing a cost for the provision of public information is necessary only if one wants to characterize the 'optimal'supply of public information. It is immediate to see how this can be done by combining our results with a speci…c cost function.
The equilibrium acquisition of private information
To solve for the equilibrium acquisition of private information, we start by revisiting how an agent's action k i is a¤ected by the quality of her private information p x i . These …rst steps follow closely from the analysis in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , adapted to the possibility that di¤erent agents possess information of di¤erent quality.
First note that, under complete information about , the unique equilibrium features each agent taking an action k i = ( ) where ( ) 0 + 1 ( ) with 0
Then consider the problem of an agent j, whose quality of information is p x j : Optimality requires that, for any (x; y); the agent's action
Using the fact that U k ( ; ; 0; ) = 0 and that U is quadratic, the above reduces to
where U kK jU kk j measures the slope of individual best responses to aggregate activity, and is what in the literature is referred to as the 'equilibrium degree of coordination'. 7 To save on notation, we will often replace ( ) with whenever there is no need to express the dependence on . Now suppose that all agents i 6 = j acquired the same quality of information p x . Because agent j has zero measure, from Proposition 1 in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , in the unique equilibrium of the continuation game, each agent i 6 = j follows the linear strategy k i = k (x; y; p x ; p z ) with
where
and where = (p x ; p z ) is given by
Then, the aggregate action is linear in ( ; y) and it can be written as
where G (x j ; p x ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of x conditional on when the precision of private information is p x , and where = (p x ; p z ) is as in (3). For future reference, we denote by g(xj ; p x ) the density of G(xj ; p x ): (1), and using the fact that
where j pz pz+px j , we have that agent j's best response to all other agents following the strategy (2) is for her to follow the strategy
As it is evident from (5), the sensitivity of agent j's actions to the two sources of information is driven by (i) the quality of agent j's private information relative to that of public information, j ,
(ii) the importance that she assigns to aligning her action to the other agents'actions, , (iii) and the sensitivity of the other agents'actions to their private and public sources of information, which in turn depends on the 'commonality'of their information , that is, on the quality of other agents' private information p x relative to public. As is well known, a stronger value for aligning decisions induces more sensitivity to public sources of information, for the latter provide a better estimator of other agents'actions.
Knowing how the agent will use her information, we can now compute the quality of information that maximizes the agent's ex-ante utility as a best response to the quality of information p x acquired by the other agents.
denote the agent's ex-ante expected payo¤ when the quality of her private information is p x j , the quality of all other agents' private information is p x ; and the quality of public information is p z .
Note that the expectation is here over (~ ;ỹ;x j ). As we show in Appendix A (proof of Proposition 1), using the law of iterated expectations, integrating by parts, and applying the envelope theorem (which means disregarding the e¤ects of a variation of p x j on k j and simply focusing on how a variation of p x j impacts the distribution of x j for each given ), we have that
is the information index corresponding to (x j ; ; p x j ). This index captures how a variation in the precision p x j a¤ects the probability of observing a signal above x j in state , normalized by the
The result in (6) is intuitive: the bene…t of more precise private information comes from the fact that, on average, it allows the agent to increase her action in those situations where the marginal utility of a higher action is positive and reducing it in those situations where it is negative, thus increasing her payo¤.
Using the normality of the information structure and the fact that the agent's optimal use of information is given by (4) yields
, along with the fact that, by de…nition of the completeinformation equilibrium, U k ( ; ; 0; ) = 0, and that the public signal, and thus the aggregate error K , are orthogonal to the individual noise j = x j , (7) reduces to
where j = j (p x j ; p x ; p z ) is given by (5). Because is concave in p x j , we have that the optimal choice of p x j is implicitly given by the …rst order condition
Using the de…nition of j then yields the following result (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Fix the precision of public information p z and suppose that all agents i 6 = j acquire information of quality p x . The best response of agent j is to acquire information of quality p x j implicitly de…ned by
A few observations are worth making. First, as one should expect, the amount of private information acquired by each individual is decreasing in the cost of information acquisition. Second, when actions are strategic complements (i.e., 2 (0; 1)), an increase in the precision of other agents' private information induces each agent to acquire more precise private information. The opposite is true when actions are strategic substitutes (i.e., when 2 ( 1; 0)). This result is fully consistent with those of Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) are strategic complements, agent j has an incentive to increase the precision of her private signal in order to better align it with the private information available to the other agents. Conversely, when actions are strategic substitutes, agent j aims at reducing the degree of alignment between her action and those of other agents, and to do so she reduces the precision of her private information.
One can also see from (9) that the precision of the information that each agent acquires is increasing in both (i) the sensitivity of the complete-information equilibrium actions 1 to fundamentals; and (ii) the curvature of individual payo¤s, jU kk j. Both e¤ects should be expected, for they imply a higher value for aligning one's actions to the underlying fundamentals, and hence a higher bene…t of more precise information.
Having characterized the properties of individual best responses, we now turn to the equilibrium collection of private information.
Proposition 2 In the unique symmetric equilibrium, each agent acquires private information of precisionp x implicitly given byp
The proof follows from setting p x j = p x in (9). Note that, in equilibrium, the dispersion of individual actions in the cross section of the population satis…es
Applying (8) to the symmetric case j = , then note that, in equilibrium, the precision of private informationp x acquired by each agent is implicitly given by
where the partial derivative in (11) is obtained by holding constant both the distribution of the aggregate action K( ; y) as well as the strategy k(x; yjp x ; p z ) that the individual plans to follow to map her information into her actions. In other words, in equilibrium, the marginal bene…t that each agent assigns to an increase in the precision of her private information coincides with the marginal reduction in the dispersion of her action around the mean action, weighted by the importance jU kk j that the individual assigns to such reduction. This is intuitive, given that, from the usual envelope arguments, the individual expects her information to be used optimally once collected. As we will see below, this interpretation will help us understand the sources of ine¢ ciency in the acquisition of private information. Note also that the amount of private informationp x collected in equilibrium is decreasing in the degree of strategic complementarity in agents' actions, . This follows from the fact that a higher degree of strategic complementarity increases agents'incentives to align their actions, and hence it reduces the value they attach to learning the fundamental . The opposite result obtains under strategic substitutability.
Besides the comparative statics above, the most interesting feature of Condition (10) is that it permits us to characterize the e¤ects of an increase in the precision of public information on the equilibrium acquisition of private information, which are summarized in the following Corollary, the proof of which follows directly from (10).
Corollary 1 (Crowding out e¤ects of public information) (i) An increase in the precision of public information reduces the precision of private information acquired in equilibrium:
The substitutability between public and private information is increasing in the equilibrium degree of coordination:
Part (i) of Corollary 1 highlights the substitutability between public and private information, while part (ii) highlights how such a substitutability increases with the equilibrium degree of coordination, .
The intuition for part (i) is quite straightforward: when agents possess more precise public information, they can better forecast both the fundamental and the aggregate action K; in which case there is less value in acquiring private information. The intuition for part (ii) rests on the fact that the value of public information, relative to that of private information, consists in better permitting the agents to align their individual actions. The higher the value that the agents assign to aligning their actions, the higher the value of public information relative to private, and hence the stronger the substitutability between the two sources of information. 8 Finally, that the degree of substitutability between private and public information is decreasing in the precision of public 8 The results in the Corollary are consistent with the …ndings in Propositions 1 and 2 of Myatt and Wallace (2012) , who adopt a less general utility representation, but a more general information structure. A similar substitutability result can also be found in Wong (2008) , who considers a setup in which an increase in the transparency of the information provided by a policy maker (i.e., a monetary authority) reduces the share of agents that purchase private information about the fundamental. information comes from the convexity of the cost of acquiring private information: the higher the precision p z of public information, the lower the precisionp x of private information in equilibrium, but then the lower the marginal cost of an increase in the precision of private information and hence the smaller the further reduction in the precision of private information triggered by an increase in the precision of public information.
The e¢ cient acquisition of private information
We now turn to the characterization of the e¢ cient acquisition of private information. Following the pertinent literature, the e¢ ciency notion we use is the one corresponding to the team problem.
In particular, we want to understand what is the best society could do if it could control the way its agents acquire and process information, but without being able to transfer information from one agent to another. As in the rest of the literature, the welfare criterion we adopt is the ex-ante utility of a representative agent, net of the cost of information acquisition:
In other words, we are interested in a strategy k (x; y) along with a precision of private information
where P ( ; y; p z ) denotes the joint distribution of ( ; y) when the precision of public information is p y , K( ; y; p x ) = R x k (x; y) dG(xj ; p x ) denotes the level of aggregate activity when each agent follows the strategy k (x; y), and k ( ; y) = [ R x [k (x; y) K( ; y; p x )] 2 dP (xj ; p x )] 1=2 denotes the dispersion of individual actions in the cross section of the population. To this purpose, let
denote welfare under a utilitarian aggregator. Our interest is in allocations that maximize exante utility. The function W is just a convenient instrument for computing ex-ante utility. Next, let ( ) be the unique solution to W K ( ; 0; ) = 0; that is,
Note that ( ) is the …rst-best allocation. Following Angeletos and Pavan (2007) , ex-ante utility for any arbitrary strategy k(x; y) and arbitrary precisions of private and public information (p x ; p y )
can then be conveniently expressed as
where W U kk + U < 0. In other words, ex-ante utility under an arbitrary strategy k(x; y) equals ex-ante utility under the …rst-best allocation , discounted by two losses. 9 The …rst one originates in the discrepancy between the aggregate activity K and the …rst-best activity. This ine¢ ciency would obtain even if all agents were to take the same action. The second ine¢ ciency originates in the dispersion of individual actions in the cross-section of the population.
Fixing the precision of private and public information; we also know from Angeletos and Pavan (2007) that the e¢ cient use of information requires that all agents follow the linear strategy
and
Equivalently, the e¢ cient strategy is the unique strategy that solves the functional equation
where K( ; y; p x ; p z ) = R x k (x; y; p x ; p z ) dG(xj ; p x ). The coe¢ cient can be interpreted as the socially optimal degree of coordination; it is the level of complementarity ( > 0) or substitutability ( < 0) that the planner would like all agents to perceive in order for the equilibrium of the economy to coincide with the e¢ cient allocation. 10 From (14), one can verify that is decreasing with social aversion to volatility (jW KK j) and increasing with social aversion to dispersion (jW j).
Note that, just as determines the relative sensitivity of equilibrium allocations to public and private information, determines the relative sensitivity of the e¢ cient allocation to the two sources of information. By comparing to , it is therefore possible to see that the sensitivity of the equilibrium allocation to common noise is ine¢ ciently large when and only when the equilibrium degree of coordination is higher than the socially optimal one; i.e., if and only if .
Next note that, for any given precisions (p x ; p z ) of private and public information, welfare under the e¢ cient allocation k (x; y; p x ; p z ) can be expressed as
9 To save on notation, we let = ( ), whenever not confusing. 1 0 The statement here is for economies that are e¢ cient under complete information; i.e., for which = . As one can easily see from (15), e¢ ciency in the use of information requires both that = and that = .
and where~ ,k , andK are shortcuts for (~ ); k (x;ỹ; p x ; p z ) and
We are now ready to turn to the e¢ cient acquisition of private information. This is instrumental to our understanding of what ine¢ ciency, if any, arises in the way information is collected in equilibrium, and on how such ine¢ ciency relates to the way information is then used in equilibrium.
As it will become clear in the next section, it is also instrumental to our understanding of the social value of public information, when one recognizes the endogenous response in the acquisition of private information.
Using the envelope theorem and observing that, holding constant the strategy k , the nonfundamental volatility of the e¢ cient allocation is independent of the quality of private information, we then have that the e¢ cient acquisition of private information p x is given by the …rst-order
where @V ar[(k K ) j p x ; p z ]=@p x is the partial derivative of dispersion with respect to the quality of private information, holding constant the e¢ cient allocation.
Note that the social (marginal) bene…t of more precise private information is simply the reduction in the dispersion of individual actions around the mean action, weighted by the social aversion to dispersion jW j=2. Importantly, the marginal e¤ect of an increase of p x on dispersion is computed holding constant the strategy k (x; y; p x ; p z ) that de…nes the e¢ cient use of information.
Using (12), we then have that
where = (p x ; p z ) is given by (13). Hence, we can write
Using (13), we then obtain the following result, which follows directly from the arguments above along with the quasi-concavity of the welfare function w (p x ; p z ).
Proposition 3
The e¢ cient acquisition of private information is for each agent to acquire private information of precision p x implicitly given by
Comparing the results in Propositions 2 and 3 then leads to the following conclusion, whose formal proof follows from comparing (11) and (16).
Proposition 4 Letp x denote the precision of private information collected in equilibrium and p x the precision of private information that maximizes welfare when the planner can control the way agents use their available information. Thenp x < p x (resp.,p x > p x ) if and only if
(resp., if and only if the sign of the inequality in (17) is reversed).
To understand the result, recall from the analysis above that both the private and the social marginal bene…t of an increase in the precision p x of private information come from the marginal reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of individual actions. 11 The magnitude of this reduction depends on the sensitivity of individual actions to private information, which is given by 2 1 (1 ) 2 under the equilibrium strategy and by 2 1 (1 ) 2 under the e¢ cient strategy. The weight that the planner assigns to reducing cross-sectional dispersion is jW j, while the weight that the individual assigns to reducing the dispersion of her action around the mean action is jU kk j: We thus have that the amount of private information collected in equilibrium falls short of the e¢ cient level if and only if the marginal reduction in cross-sectional dispersion under the equilibrium allocation, weighted by the importance that each agent assigns to dispersion, falls short of the marginal reduction in dispersion under the e¢ cient allocation, weighted by the importance that the planner assigns to dispersion. Put it di¤erently, e¢ ciency in the acquisition of information requires (i) e¢ ciency in the use of information (formally, 1 (1 ) = 1 (1 )) and (ii) alignment between the private and social bene…t of reducing the dispersion of individual actions in the population, which obtains when and only when jU kk j = jU kk + U j. 12
The following corollary is then an immediate implication of the previous result.
Corollary 2 (i) Consider economies that are e¢ cient in their use of information ( = and = ). Thenp x < p x (resp.,p x > p x ) if and only if U < 0 (resp., if and only if U > 0).
(ii) Consider economies that are e¢ cient under complete information and whose ine¢ ciency in the collection of private information originates in the way information is used in equilibrium ( = ; U = 0 but 6 = ). Thenp x < p x (resp.,p x > p x ) if and only if > (resp., if and only if < ):
(iii) Consider economies whose ine¢ ciency in the collection and use of information originates in the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation (U = 0, = , but 6 = ). Then p x < p x (resp.,p x > p x ) if and only if 1 < 1 (resp., if and only if 1 > 1 ).
1 1 Both marginal reductions are computed holding constant, respectively, the equilibrium and the e¢ cient strategies by usual envelope arguments. 1 2 Note that, while in principle e¢ ciency in the acquisition can obtain even without e¢ ciency in the use of information, this can happen only under the knife-edge case where the discrepancy between 1(1 ) and 1 (1 ) is perfectly o¤set by the discrepancy between jU kk j and jW j.
Let's start with part (i). Because in these economies the equilibrium use of information is e¢ cient, the marginal reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of individual actions under the equilibrium strategy coincides with the marginal reduction under the e¢ cient strategy. That the equilibrium use of information is e¢ cient, however, does not guarantee that the private and the social marginal bene…t of more precise private information coincide. The reason is that the private bene…ts fail to take into account the direct, non-strategic, e¤ect that the dispersion of individual actions has on payo¤s, as captured by U . Because this externality has no strategic e¤ects, it is not internalized and is thus a source of possible ine¢ ciency in the collection of private information.
In particular, the amount of private information collected in equilibrium falls short of the e¢ cient level in the presence of a negative externality from dispersion, U < 0, while the opposite is true for economies where the externality is positive.
Next, consider part (ii) and take an economy where > . Because there are no direct externalities from dispersion (i.e., U = 0), the weight that private agents assign to a reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of individual actions coincides with the socially optimal one (i.e., jW j = jU kk j). The discrepancy between the private and the social marginal bene…t of an increase in the precision p x of private information then simply comes from the fact that, in equilibrium, agents rely too little on private information when choosing their actions ( 2 1 (1 )) 2 < 2 1 (1 ) 2 ).
This implies that the marginal reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of individual actions is more pronounced under the e¢ cient strategy than under the equilibrium strategy. In turn, this makes the social marginal bene…t of more precise private information larger than the private bene…t, thus explaining the equilibrium underinvestment in the acquisition of private information.
The same logic explains part (iii) in the proposition with the discrepancy in the sensitivity of individual actions to private information now coming from the gap between the complete-information allocation, ; and the …rst-best allocation, ; as opposed to the gap between the equilibrium and the socially e¢ cient degree of coordination.
The results in Proposition 4 compare the amount of private information collected in equilibrium with the amount that a planner would like the agents to collect, if the planner could also dictate to the agents how to use their available information. This comparison is of interest, for it tells us in which direction the policy maker would like to correct ine¢ ciencies in the collection of private information when it can also correct ine¢ ciencies in the use of information (see, e.g., Angeletos
and Pavan, 2009, for how …scal policy can restore e¢ ciency in the use of information).
For certain problems of interest, though, it is important to compare the amount of private information collected in equilibrium with the amount that the planner would like the agents to collect if the planner were unable to change the way society uses the information it collects. This is akin to investigating how welfare, under the equilibrium allocation and net of the cost of information acquisition, changes with the precision of private information around the levelp x selected in equilibrium. As it will become clear in the next section, addressing this question is particularly relevant for the social value of public information; that is, for the comparative statics of welfare, under the equilibrium strategy, with respect to the quality of public information. The remainder of this section is thus devoted to the analysis of this question.
We start by noticing that, for any precisions (p x ; p z ) of private and public information, welfare under the equilibrium allocation is given by the same representation of equilibrium welfare following from Conditions (15) and (16) in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) :
where E[W (~ ; 0;~ )] is expected welfare under the complete-information allocation , whereas
are the welfare losses due to incomplete information. The …rst two terms in L(p x ; p z ) are analogous to the two terms in L (p x ; p z ); except that they are computed under the equilibrium allocation, as opposed to the e¢ cient allocation. They measure the welfare losses due to, respectively, the volatility of the aggregate action K around its complete-information counterpart , and the dispersion of individual actions around the aggregate action. The covariance term is a novel …rst-order e¤ect that is present only in economies that are ine¢ cient under complete information (i.e., for which 6 = ): a positive correlation between K , the 'aggregate error'due to incomplete information, and W K , the social return to aggregate activity, contributes to higher welfare, whereas a negative correlation between the two contributes to lower welfare. This covariance term can in turn be expressed as
captures the covariance between the complete-information activity and the complete-information 'e¢ ciency gap'( ), whereas
captures the covariance between the 'aggregate error'due to incomplete information (K ) and the complete-information equilibrium ( ). Using the fact that
and the de…nition of , after some algebra, we then have that welfare under the equilibrium allocation can be expressed as
Using (19), we then have that the marginal e¤ect on equilibrium welfare of an increase in the precision of private information p x is given by 13
The …rst term in (20) is the direct marginal e¤ect of a reduction in cross-sectional dispersion that obtains as a result of an increase in p x ; holding …xed the agents' strategy. The third term combines the marginal e¤ects on volatility and dispersion of changing the agents' strategy by inducing them to rely more on their private information and less on their public information (recall that @ (p x ; p z )=@p x < 0). Finally, the last term, which is relevant only in economies that are ine¢ cient under complete information, captures the e¤ect of changing the agents' strategy on
; that is on the way the 'error' due to incomplete information covaries with the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation. Clearly, by usual envelope arguments, these last two terms are absent in economies where the equilibrium use of information is e¢ cient ( = and = ) or, alternatively, when the planner can dictate to the agents how to use their information.
Comparing the marginal bene…t that each individual assigns in equilibrium to an increase in the precision p x of her private information (as given by (11)) with the marginal bene…t that the planner assigns to the same increase then yields the following result.
Proposition 5 Let p x denote the precision of private information that maximizes welfare when the planner cannot control the way the agents use their available information. The same conclusions as in parts (i)-(iii) of Corollary 2 hold relative to p x .
Clearly, in economies that are e¢ cient in their use of information ( = and = ), the precision of private information that maximizes welfare is the same, irrespective of whether or not the planner can control the way the agents use their available information (i.e., p x = p x ).
As discussed above, in this case, ine¢ ciencies in the equilibrium collection of private information originate entirely in the discrepancy between the private jU kk j and the social jW j weights assigned to reducing cross-sectional dispersion of individual actions.
Next, consider economies that are e¢ cient under complete information and where the ine¢ -ciency in the collection of private information originates in the way information is used in equilibrium ( = ; U = 0 but 6 = ). In this case, the amount of private information p x that the planner would like the agents to collect when he cannot control the way the agents use their available information can be either higher or lower than the amount p x that he would like them to collect when he can dictate to the agents how to use their available information. Nonetheless, compared to the amountp x collected in equilibrium, the same conclusions hold as in part (ii) of Corollary 2. When agents are over-concerned about aligning their actions and hence rely too much on their public sources of information; the planner would like them to collect more precise private information than they do in equilibrium, so as to bring their use of information closer to the e¢ cient level (recall that (p x ; p x ) is decreasing in p x ). The opposite is true when the agents'concern about aligning their actions falls short of the e¢ cient level, in which case the planner would like them to cut on their collection of private information (that is, p x <p x when < ).
Finally, consider economies where the ine¢ ciency in the collection and use of information originates in the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation (U = 0, = , but 6 = ).
In this case, the marginal e¤ect on welfare of an increase in the precision of private information, evaluated at the equilibrium levelp x , is given by
from which one can see that the amount of private information acquired in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low (resp. high) if 1 < 1 (resp., 1 > 1 ). The intuition for this result is simple. Economies where 1 < 1 are economies where
That is, in these economies, the 'error'K ~ due to incomplete information covaries negatively with the ine¢ ciency W K ( ; 0; ) of the complete-information allocation, which brings the economy more far away from the …rst best level. More precise private information, by bringing the aggregate activity closer to the complete-information level then increases e¢ ciency. This …rst-order e¤ect is, however, not internalized by the agents, which explains why the planner would like them to collect more precise private information than they do in equilibrium, despite the planner's inability to control the way society uses the information it collects. The opposite is true for economies where the 'error'K ~ covaries positively with the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation (that is, for economies where 1 > 1 ): In this case, 'ignorance is a blessing'for it partially corrects the ine¢ ciency of the complete-information allocation. As a result, the planner would like society to collect less precise private information than it does in equilibrium.
Remark. The economies considered in Corollary 2 and Proposition 5 are benchmark cases where the source of the ine¢ ciency in the collection of private information can be isolated and where the ine¢ ciency can be unambiguously signed. More generally, one can show that there exists a function ( 1 1 ; ; p z ) that is increasing in the di¤erences ( 1 1 ; ) and equal to zero at (0; 0), such that, for any ( 1 ; 1 ; ; ), the equilibrium precision of private information falls short of the e¢ cient level; i.e.,p x < p x , if and only if U < ( 1 1 ; ; p z ).
The social value of public information when private information is endogenous
We now turn to the welfare e¤ects of variations in the precision of public information. The key novelty with respect to previous work in this literature is that the analysis below takes into account how variations in the precision of public information a¤ect agents' incentives to acquire private information.
Intuitively, relative to the case where the precision of private information is exogenous, an increase in the precision of public information, by inducing agents to cut on their acquisition of private information (equivalently, by inducing them to reduce the attention they allocate to private sources of information), induces a stronger increase in the commonality = p z =(p x + p z ) of information and a smaller increase (or even a decrease) in the accuracy of information, = p z + p x . Whether the net e¤ect on welfare is larger than when neglecting the endogeneity of private information in turn depends on whether the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low or high, as shown in the next proposition. 14 Proposition 6 Recognizing the crowding-out e¤ ects of public information on private information reduces the social value of public information if and only if the precision of the private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low:
The result follows directly from the fact that
along with the fact that a higher precision of public information always crowds out the acquisition of private information, as established in Corollary 1.
The following result is then an immediate implication of the above proposition along with the results in Corollary 2 and Proposition 5.
Corollary 3 Recognizing the endogeneity of private information reduces the social value of public information in economies where 1 1 , , and U 0 (strictly when at least one of the inequalities is strict). It increases the social value of public information in economies where 1 1 , , and U 0 (again, strictly when at least one of the inequalities is strict).
In certain cases, recognizing the endogeneity of private information is particularly important, for not only it a¤ects the 'magnitude'of the social value of public information, it may even revert its sign (see the application to economies with negative production externalities in Section 7 below).
However, as the next result shows, this is never the case in economies where the collection of private information is ine¢ ciently low and where the equilibrium degree of coordination is not too high relative to the e¢ cient one (the proof is in Appendix A).
Proposition 7 Take any economy where the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low (i.e.,p x p x ). There exists a critical threshold jW KK j jU kk j jW j fjW j + jU kk jg such that, irrespective of the equilibrium degree of substitutability between public and private information (dp x =dp z ), welfare always increases with the precision of public information if < ;
i.e., if the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the e¢ cient degree of coordination is not too large.
Note that, in economies where < ; both private and public information can contribute either positively or negatively to welfare; that is, @w(p x ; p z )=@p z and @w(p x ; p z )=@p x can be of either sign. What the bound on the discrepancy guarantees is that, whenever agents underinvest in their collection of private information (i.e., @w(p x ; p z )=@p x 0), then public information has a positive direct e¤ect on welfare (i.e., @w(p x ; p z )=@p z 0). Furthermore, irrespective of the strength of the crowding-out e¤ect that public information exerts on private information, the total e¤ect of an increase in the precision of public information is always positive (i.e., dw(p x ; p z )=dp z 0).
The following corollary is then an implication of the previous proposition.
Corollary 4 In economies where < ; recognizing the endogeneity of private information may either increase or decrease the social value of public information. However, it can never turn the social value of public information negative when it is positive ignoring the endogeneity of private information. That is,
The …rst part of the statement follows directly from the fact that, in these economies, agents may either overinvest or underinvest in the acquisition of their private information. The crowdingout e¤ect of public information on private information can thus either strengthen or weaken the direct e¤ect that more precise public information exerts on welfare. The second part follows by contradiction. Suppose that the direct e¤ect of an increase in the precision of public information on welfare is positive and yet the total e¤ect (recognizing the endogenous response of private information) is negative. That is, suppose that
For this to be possible, it must be that, at the equilibrium level, agents underinvest in their collection of private information, i.e., @w (p x ; p z ) =@p x 0. But then the result in Proposition 7 implies that dw(p x ; p z )=dp z 0, a contradiction.
Applications
In this section, we show how the results can be put to work in a few applications of interest: beauty contests, monetary economies with price-setting complementarities, and economies with negative production externalities. have shown that more precise public information may have a detrimental e¤ect on welfare in economies that resemble Keynes'beauty contests. As it is by now well understood, the detrimental e¤ect of public information stems from a coordination motive that is not warranted at the social level, namely from the fact that the equilibrium degree of coordination exceeds the socially optimal one, i.e., > : Such over-concern with coordination in turn induces agents to overreact to their public sources of information and underreact to their private ones, for the former are a better predictor than the latter of other agents'behavior.
Beauty contests
The particular payo¤ speci…cation used by to illustrate this point is
where r 2 (0; 1) is a scalar that parametrizes the intensity of the coordination motive,
, is the dispersion of other agents' actions around agent i's action, and
k is a positive externality that comes from the dispersion of other agents' actions around the mean action. This payo¤ speci…cation is thus nested in our model
, and hence 1
Combining (20) with (11), the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the precision of private information, evaluated at the equilibrium level, is given by (see Appendix A for a formal derivation of the technical conditions in this application)
As one can easily see from (21), the amount of private information collected in equilibrium can be either ine¢ ciently low or ine¢ ciently high, depending on the precision of public information p z .
Formally, there exists a threshold p 0 z > 0 such that @w(p x ; p z )=@p x < 0 if and only if p z < p 0 z . 15 Likewise, the direct e¤ect of an increase in the precision of public information on equilibrium welfare is given by
which is positive if and only if
as shown in . Using the negative dependence ofp x on p z one can then show that there exists a threshold p 00 z < p 0 z such that the inequality in (23) holds if and only if p z > p 00 z . One can then easily see how recognizing the endogenous response in the acquisition of private information may a¤ect the social value of public information. As shown in Proposition 6, when the precision of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently high (in these economies, this occurs when p z < p 0 z ), recognizing the endogeneity of private information implies revising upwards the social value of public information. This new e¤ect can be su¢ ciently strong to overturn the partial e¤ect identi…ed in the literature, making the social value of public information positive under the same conditions that would have predicted it to be negative by ignoring the endogeneity of private information.
To see this more clearly, suppose that the cost of private information acquisition is described by the iso-elastic cost function
where 2 [0; 1) is the elasticity of the marginal cost. Using (10), one can check that the equilibrium degree of substitutability between public and private information (equivalently, the crowding-out e¤ect of public information on private information) is given by
with 1 1 @p x @p z 0;
1 5 Observe from (10) that limp z !0px(pz ) = px > 0, with px implicitly given by p 2 x C 0 ( px) = jU kk j 2 1 =2; while limp z !1px(pz ) = 0: Along with the fact thatpx is strictly decreasing in pz gives the result.
as predicted by Corollary 1. Combining (21) with (22) and using (24), one can then show that the total e¤ect dw(p x ; p z ) dp z = @w(p x ; p z ) @p z + @w(p x ; p z ) @p x @p x @p z of an increase in the precision of public information (when one recognizes the crowding-out e¤ect of public information on private information) is positive if and only if
Given that 2r 1 2 (1 r) (1 r)p x < (2r 1)(1 r)p x ; this means that there exists a third threshold p 000 z < p 00 z such that the social value of public information is positive, when recognizing the endogeneity of private information, if and only if p z > p 000 z . It is then immediate that for any p z 2 (p 000 z ; p 00 z ), the social value of public information turns from negative to positive when acknowledging the endogeneity of private information.
This result may seem counterintuitive at a …rst glance. Relative to the case in which the precision of private information is exogenous, an increase in the precision of public information induces a smaller increase in accuracy 2 = p z +p x , and a larger increase in commonality =
It is known that, in these economies, welfare increases with accuracy while it decreases with commonality, due to the ine¢ ciently high level of coordination (i.e., to > ). 16 When p z < (2r 1)(1 r)p x (equivalently, when p z < p 00 z ), the positive welfare e¤ects coming from the increase in accuracy are more than o¤set by the negative welfare e¤ects due to the increase in commonality. Given that the endogeneity of private information reduces the positive e¤ects of accuracy and increases the negative e¤ects of commonality, how is it possible that recognizing the endogeneity of private information turns the social value of public information from negative to positive? The answer lies in the ine¢ ciently high level of private information collected in equilibrium.
By inducing agents to cut on their collection of private information, an increase in the precision of public information can boost welfare when the costs saved in the collection of private information more than compensate for the increase in non-fundamental volatility relative to dispersion.
At this point, one may wonder whether the opposite is also true: can the endogeneity of private information turn the sign of the social value of public information from positive to negative? As shown in Proposition 6, for this to be possible, it must be that the amount of private information collected in equilibrium is ine¢ ciently low; i.e.,p x < p x . Recall that, in these economies, this occurs whenever p z > p 0 z or, equivalently, whenever
However, because, in these economies, the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the social degree of coordination = r is never larger than = 1=(2 r), we know from Proposition 1 6 See Corollary 8 in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) . (7) that the social value of public information always remains positive when it is positive ignoring the endogeneity of private information.
The following result summarizes the above observations.
Proposition 8 Consider the class of 'beauty-contest' economies described above. Recognizing the crowding-out e¤ ects of public information on private information may either increase or decrease the social value of public information. However, while such e¤ ects may turn the sign of the social value of public information from negative to positive, they can never turn it from positive to negative.
Monetary economies with price-setting complementarities
A recent literature investigates the welfare implications of information dispersion in monetary economies with price-setting complementarities (see, e.g., Hellwig, 2005 , Adam, 2007 , Roca, 2010 , Lorenzoni, 2010 , Angeletos, Iovino, and La'O, 2011 . Here, we revisit the social value of public information in these economies, accounting for the endogeneity of the private information acquisition process. The description of how these economies can be traced back to the abstract speci…cation of our model, after the usual linear-quadratic approximations, is relegated to Appendix B. 
with v > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution among goods. In addition, the agent su¤ers disutility V (Y i ) from producing Y i units of good i: The functions J and V are both increasing and twice di¤erentiable, with J concave and V convex. The parameter is a common shock, which characterizes the disutility of e¤ort.
Each consumer-producer maximizes the (expectation of) the utility function
where denotes a subsidy optimally set by the …scal authority to o¤set the usual distortions due to monopolistic competition, P is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index, and T is the lump-sum tax in real terms used to …nance the subsidy.
The timing is such that each agent i chooses the price p i for the good she produces before learning the shock . She then commits to supply any quantity that is demanded in equilibrium at that price. As is standard in this literature, we assume that consumption decisions occur under complete information. Before setting their prices, agents choose the precision of their private information in response to the precision p z of public information set by the government.
The description of the model is completed by assuming that the in ‡uence of monetary policy on output is summarized by the quantity equation
, which can also be interpreted as a simple nominal GDP targeting; here Y h is aggregate demand for good h, while M is the aggregate money supply.
Note that this setup is similar to those in Hellwig (2005) , Adam (2007) , and Lorenzoni (2010) , except for the fact that each consumer i is the sole producer of good i, which simpli…es the analysis. 17 As we show in Appendix B, after the usual linear-quadratic approximations, this framework can be traced back to the abstract reduced-form speci…cation of our model by letting k i denote the price set by agent i (normalized by the non-stochastic steady state price level), K the aggregate price, and 2 k the dispersion of individual prices in the cross section of the population. Each consumerproducer's indirect utility -gross of the costs of information acquisition -can then be expressed as follows
where the function U (k i ; K; ) collects all terms that are constant or linear in (k i ; K; ), J C Y Y with Y denoting the non-stochastic equilibrium level of output and consumption, 18 and
captures both the curvature of the marginal utility of consumption and the sensitivity of producers' prices to the output gap.
It is then easy to see that, in these economies,
, and U = v < 0. Thus, this is an economy where actions (prices) are strategic complements, with a degree of equilibrium coordination given
v > 0 that depends on the elasticity of substitution v among goods. 19 An increase 1 7 Another di¤erence is that Hellwig (2005) assumes that agents are uncertain about monetary policy shocks but do not face idiosyncratic utility shocks. Hence, an increase in information transparency reduces price dispersion in his setup. Conversely, Lorenzoni (2010) focuses on disaggregated shocks. In his setup, more precise public information increases price dispersion, which however raises welfare since it also helps agents setting relative prices more aligned to productivity di¤erentials. 1 8 The non-stochastic equilibrium is de…ned to be the equilibrium that obtains when the variance 2 of the labor supply shock is equal to 0 and by normalizing 1 = 1. 1 9 In Roca (2010) , the degree of complementarity in prices is a¤ected both by v and by !, which is the parameter summarizing the curvature of the utility function. Conversely, in Adam (2007) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2007) , the parameter v does not play any role, as in these papers individual prices are directly proportional to the aggregate price level.
in the price level K raises the demand for the product supplied by agent i, which in turn induces her to increase her own price k i . Note also that this economy features a negative externality from price dispersion; i.e., U < 0: Observing that W KK U kk + 2U kK + U KK = ! and
, we then have that the socially optimal degree of coordination is 1
The reason why the equilibrium degree of coordination falls short of the socially optimal one is that each price setter i disregards the contribution of her price to 2 k , that is, to the dispersion of individual prices around the mean price. Finally, notice that 1
= 1=!, implying that under perfect information, the price setters'reaction to a change in the fundamental is …rst-best e¢ cient. This should not surprise given that the reduced-form payo¤ in (25) is computed under the subsidy that eliminates the distortions due to imperfect competition. However, since U < 0 and < , these economies are ine¢ cient both in the acquisition and in the use of private information.
Using Condition (20), one can then show that the marginal e¤ect on welfare of an increase in the precision of private information, evaluated at the equilibrium levelp x ; is given by: 20
Accordingly, there exists a critical threshold p 0 z such that price setters acquire too little private information when p z < p 0 z (in which casep x > v(2!(v 1)+1)p z ) and too much private information when p z > p 0 z (in which casep x < v(2!(v 1) + 1)p z ). Turning to the e¤ects of public information, by di¤erentiating (19), we have that the direct e¤ect on welfare of an increase in p z (holding constantp x ) is given by
That the direct e¤ect of public information on welfare is always positive follows from the fact that, in these economies, welfare increases with both accuracy and commonality (since 1 = 1 and < ). 21
As for the total e¤ect of an increase in p z on welfare, note that, because < and because the direct e¤ect @w (p x ; p z ) =@p z is always positive, from Proposition (7) we have that the total e¤ect dw (p x ; p z ) =dp z is also always positive. Thus, we can state the following result.
Proposition 9 Consider the class of economies with price-setting complementarities described above. Recognizing the crowding-out e¤ ects of public information on the acquisition of private information may either increase or decrease the social value of public information. However, the latter is always positive in these economies.
Negative production externalities
Lastly, consider the following stylized consumer-producer competitive economy. There is a continuum of identical agents. Each agent produces k i units of a non-di¤erentiated private good using labor as the only input. Her utility function, gross of the cost of private information acquisition, is given by
The term J (k i ) captures the utility from consuming the good, with denoting an aggregate taste shock, while the term V (k i ; K) captures the disutility of producing the good. We assume that J is increasing, di¤erentiable, and concave and that V is increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and convex in each argument; i.e.,
Finally, we assume that the marginal disutility of producing the good increases with the aggregate activity K; i.e., V kK (k i ; K) > 0. The negative e¤ect exerted by aggregate production K on both U (k i ; K; k ; ) and U k (k i ; K; k ; ) captures negative externalities such as those due to pollution or congestion. 22
By taking a quadratic expansion of U (k i ; K; k ; ) around the non-stochastic equilibrium k i = K corresponding to = 1 (recall that 1 is the unconditional mean for ) and normalizing 1 = 1, we can conveniently write U (k i ; K; k ; ) as follows
where U (k i ; K; ) collects all the terms that are constant or linear in (k i ; K; ) and where J k
We then have that
Since U = 0, this application features no direct externalities from dispersion. Contrary to the previous two applications, the equilibrium degree of strategic complementarity
< 0, re ‡ecting the negative marginal externality on production coming from high aggregate activity.
> 0 so that the …rst-best response to a change 2 2 Classical examples include Tybout (1972) and Rothenberg (1970) . Models with similar qualitative features also obtain in di¤erent frameworks, such as those related to the exploitation of natural resources (e.g., Scott Gordon, 1954, and Baumol and Oates, 1988) , or to the private provision of public goods (e.g., Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986) .
in the fundamental is 1
Hence, in the complete-information equilibrium, agents overreact to a change in the fundamental; that is, 1 > 1 > 0.
From W U kk + U = U kk we then have that 1
that the socially optimal degree of coordination falls short of the privately perceived one. This follows directly from the fact that individual producers ignore their contribution to the negative externality.
Hence, this economy is ine¢ cient in the use of information. To see how such ine¢ ciency in turn impacts the e¢ ciency in the collection of private information and ultimately the social value of public information, note that, after some algebra, (20) is equal to 23
meaning that, in equilibrium, agents acquire too much private information relative to what is socially e¢ cient.
Turning to the social value of public information, using (19), we have
that, together with (28), yields
From Proposition 6, it is then immediate that, in these economies, recognizing the endogeneity of private information contributes to a higher social value of public information (thanks to its crowding out e¤ect on the acquisition of private information, which is always ine¢ ciently high). Whether the total e¤ect is positive or negative depends on the strength of the degree of substitutability perceived in equilibrium. When < 1= , the negative direct e¤ect that more precise public information has on welfare is so strong that, irrespective of the substitutability between public and private information (recall that @px @pz 1 1 from Corollary 1), the total e¤ect of an increase in p z on welfare is always negative, so that it is always optimal to provide the economy with as little public information as possible. Likewise, when 1=(2 + 3 ) < 0; the direct positive e¤ect that public information has on welfare is so strong that welfare would increase with the precision of public information, even if one were to ignore the endogeneity of private information.
Finally, consider the more interesting case in which 1= < < 1=(2 + 3 ): Recognizing the endogeneity of private information may then turn the sign of the social value of public information from negative to positive. Recalling that lim pz!0px = p x > 0 and lim pz!1px = 0; there exists a critical level p 0 z such that, in the absence of any substitutability between private and public information, welfare increases with p z if and only if p z p 0 z : By continuity, we then have that there exists a second critical threshold p 00 z < p 0 z such that, for any p z 2 (p 00
That is, the social value of public information is negative when ignoring the endogeneity of private information and positive otherwise.
We summarize the above observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Consider the class of economies with negative production externalities described above, featuring an excessively low degree of strategic substitutability in actions, < < 0, and an excessively high sensitivity of the complete-information allocation to the underlying fundamental, 1 > 1 . Recognizing the crowding-out e¤ ects of public information on private information always increases the social value of public information, turning the latter positive in situations where it would have been negative ignoring such e¤ ects.
Concluding remarks
This paper investigated the sources of ine¢ ciency in the equilibrium acquisition of private information. It then showed how the social value of public information is a¤ected by the endogenous response in the acquisition of private information.
In future work, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to richer speci…cations of the information structure, such as those considered in the rational inattention literature as well as those recently studied in Myatt and Wallace (2012) . That paper allows agents to access at a cost a variety of signals whose 'publicity' (i.e., correlation of errors across agents) is determined endogenously by the attention paid by the agents to the di¤erent sources of information. Paralleling the analysis in the current paper, it would be interesting to examine what drives ine¢ ciencies in the attention that agents allocate to the di¤erent sources of information. Such a characterization could in turn be used to study how welfare in these economies is a¤ected by variations in the quality of the di¤erent sources of information (in the terminology of Myatt and Wallace, in the quality of 'sender noise') taking into account the agents'endogenous response in their allocation of attention (that is, the endogeneity of 'receiver noise').
Another promising line of research consists in exploring the implications of our results in fully micro-founded models of the business cycle such as those recently considered in Angeletos, Iovino and La'O (2011) and in Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) .
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Agent j's best response to the other agents collecting information of quality p x when the quality of public information is p z is to collect information of quality p x j so as to maximize
Using the law of iterated expectations, integrating by parts, and applying the envelope theorem (which means disregarding the e¤ects of a variation of p x j on k j and simply focusing on how a variation of p x j impacts the distribution G(x j j ; p x j ) for each given ), the agent's …rst order condition is
that, using the de…nition of I(x j ; ; p x j ); rewrites as (6) in the main text. Using the normality of the information structure
where ( ) is the density of the Standard Normal distribution. This means that
Replacing (30) into (6) and using the fact that
yields (7). The rest of the proof follows from the arguments in the main text. Q.E.D.
Derivation of Condition (20) . Using (19), we have that
Substituting jW KK j = (1 )jW j, the sum of the third and fourth addendum can be rewritten
Using the fact that
we then have that (31) Using the de…nitions of (p x ; p z ) and (p x ; p z ) then gives the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Replacing the formula for (p x ; p z ) into (20) and using (11), we have that the marginal e¤ect of an increase in p x on equilibrium welfare, evaluated at the equilibrium precision of private informationp x is given by. Hence, dw(p x ; p z )=dp z 0 whenever 
Appendix B. Price setting complementarities
In this appendix, we show how the economy described in Section 7.2 can be traced back to our linear-quadratic speci…cation, after the usual approximations.
We start by characterizing the demand for each good, given the observed prices. In equilibrium, each agent i chooses her consumption bundle so as to maximize
subject to the budget constraint Z 
denotes the Dixit-Stiglitz price index. At the optimum, the budget constraint binds and each agent i's demand for each good h is given by
Aggregating the individual demand functions (35) for each good h over all agents i, we then obtain that the aggregate demand for each good h is given by
Furthermore, substituting the individual demand for each good h; as given by (35), into the budget constraint, and using the de…nition of the aggregate price index in (34), we have that each agent's budget constraint can be rewritten as
By substituting the aggregate demand for good i; as given by (36), into the budget constraint (37) and the latter back into the individual demand for good h (i.e., into Condition (35)), we obtain the following optimality condition
Using ( Given that the production subsidy that o¤sets the distortion from monopolistic competition is = 1 v 1 , and taking into account that T = Y and that T = Y , we obtain that 24
Hence, the aggregate consumptionc h = R [0;1] c hi di of good h in the cross section of the population is approximated byc
2 4 To see why these two conditions hold, note that, from the optimality condition (38), the non-stochastic steady- Next, we take a second-order expansion of C i around C that gives Recalling the de…nition ofc i , this reduces to 
Substituting (42) and 2 i = v 2 2 p ; into (41) and using Y = C, we obtain that
By applying (39) to good i and agent j; we have that agent j's individual demand for good i is
Aggregating across all agents j and using Y i = R [0;1] c ij dj yields
Lastly, using (34) and (36), note that the money supply equation can be rewritten as P Y = M .
The …rst-order Taylor approximation for the money market equilibrium is
so that we obtain Y Y = P P Y = P :
By using (45) and the fact that P =p (by the …rst-order approximation of (34)), conditions (43) and (44) become
respectively.
Lastly, following the pertinent literature, we compute a second-order approximation of each agent's utility function around the non-stochastic steady state:
Now observe that, due to the e¤ect of the production subsidy = 1 v 1 , the non-stochastic steady state corresponding to the complete-information equilibrium for = 1 satis…es
Substituting (46) and (47) into (48) and using (49), we obtain that
By collecting in U ;p P ; p i P all terms that are constant or linear in ( ;p; p i ), letting 1 = 1;
> 0, and J C Y Y , and disregarding all terms of order higher than two then leads to
Replacing k i p i = P , K p= P ; and 2 k = 2 p , we then have that (50) reduces to (25) in the main text. Q.E.D.
